Minning Network Ltd. Reports & Reviews (1)
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SCAMPULSE
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SCAMPULSE
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Scammer's website Instagram
Scammer's email [email protected]
Country United States
Victim Location TX 75605, USA
Total money lost $29,000
Type of a scam Investment
[email protected]
Better Business Bureau (BBB)
3033 Wilson Blvd Ste 600, Arlington, Virginia, 22203,
USA
This is to complain against the Cash App
URGENCY: HIGH
IMPORTANCE: HIGH
[WITHOUT PREJUDICE]
I wish to practice my right as a customer of Cash App to use your organisation's service, seeking a formal, impartial investigation to amicably settle my dispute with Cash App.
In order to clear up the myriad of letters and correspondences I have hitherto sent to Cash App respecting my complaint, I believe it will substantially strengthen both my case and your understanding, by taking a deeper look at the happenings of my case, and analysing the relevant facts in an objective and comprehensive fashion.
It is crucial to note that I have been manipulated, socially-engineered and coerced to engage these fraudulent criminals. Much to my embarrassment, I recognise that I am the victim of an investment scam.
My complaint to the ScamPulse.com has arisen as I do not consider, by any stretch of the imagination, the conduct of Cash App to be commensurate with their legal role and responsibility to their customers. They sell a service to look after their customers, protect their money and are a financial institution that maintains a traditional relationship and way of working with its customers.
During the complaints process with Cash App, I found their communication ineffective, which further hides their conduct to management and diminishes the service offering to their clients. They are struggling to adapt their business offering in the ever-changing world of IT development. The internet is presenting a real problem which they choose to manage in a way which is not in line with rules and regulations of ScamPulse.com as well as their own internal policy and procedures sold to their clients.
General Obligation:
In June this year, I fell victim to two multi-layered scam operations run by “Mining Network Ltd” / “miningnetworkltd.com” which involved me making deposits for a total amount of 30,000.00 USD from my Cash App account to fraudulent investment firm(s).
When determining what’s reasonable and fair, we should focus on the issue of liability; common queries include, but are not limited to, the following (i) whether Cash App did not take notice of any rule, law, or regulation, and/or possibly missed any material elements of the relevant bylaws or codes of conduct, that may have prevented them from protecting my financial safety; (ii) whether by virtue of Cash App’s custodianship over my funds or by its control over them, they owed a fiduciary duty to the me and if so, whether that duty was breached; (iii) whether Cash App promoted the transaction(s) in question despite being aware of the nature of the transaction(s) in question (iv) whether Cash App was in compliance with its own policies and procedures; (v) whether Cash App owed duties to myself, what the scope of those duties was, and whether Cash App did not uphold those duties; (vi) whether Cash App’s conduct was unfair; and (vii) whether Cash App has within its power the ability to, and should, compensate me for the harm that has befallen me.
Upon identification of such unusual or suspicious activity, it is crucial that the relevant staff member adequately describe the factors making an activity or transaction suspicious, thoroughly depict the extent and nature of this activity and properly communicate to the customer that such activity meets the relevant criteria of fraud.
In providing its services to a customer, a financial institution is required by law to exercise the care and skill of a diligent, prudent banker. In this case, this means that the payment service provider should not turn a ‘blind eye’ to known facts pointing to a real possibility that their customer is being scammed. In other words, Cash App must have had special knowledge of what was occurring or been alerted to a real possibility of fraud taking place. The financial institution must have known or reasonably ought to have known that I was dealing with a scammer.
Granted, there is room for diversity of view insofar as reasonableness is concerned. Indeed, there is a sense in which the standard of care of the reasonable person involves in its application a subjective element.
However, it must be remembered that the correct test is always reasonable care in all circumstances, not average care. The fact that most people behave in a certain way may be good evidence that the conduct is reasonable, but this is not necessarily the case. Although reasonableness is a very fluid concept, all of the evidence suggests that Cash App did not foresee the fraud and disregarded even the most obvious dangers in this respect.
Situations do tend to repeat themselves and it is advisable to examine previous outcomes to see how the standard of the reasonable person should be applied, and that lessons can be learnt from the errors of the past.
Cash App’s Position:
On December 4th, Cash App wrote in a letter “Cash App is unable to reverse a bitcoin transaction once it is initiated. We cannot open a case for disputes for disputes because this payment was authorized by you although we recognize this is an inconvenient situation.”
Refuting Cash App’s arguments from a purely logical perspective:
Cash App’s position is that the features of the situation at hand do not generate a genuine obligation to protect innocent and helpless victims; they are essentially arguing that common sense-based approaches are doomed to fail, leaving their exclusively technical account of the subject matter as the only meaningful choice. For reasons which are unclear, this extremely serious situation barely gets the attention it deserves even though ample evidence has been offered in support of this complaint.
In Cash App’s view, it is implied that we should not home in (and consequently rely) on unwritten laws, practicality, good judgement, reasonableness, sharpness, sensibleness, past outcomes, and insight, when taking appropriate precautions. To underscore, once again, such views are at odds with common sense and are wildly irresponsible.
Imagine a view according to which the one and only thing that can make Cash App morally obligated to do something is having it written down somewhere. Pursuant to this view, if Cash App encounter the suffering of totally naive victims, they are only obligated to intervene in or remedy the situation, to the degree required by written material. This is unbecoming for a reputable establishment such as Cash App.
I have reviewed the material hereto sent by Cash App carefully, and it unfortunately provides no response to my fundamental argument concerning the degree of care. Given its size, influence, and the resources at its disposal, this establishment clearly had a far greater capacity than an individual such as myself had, to determine the level and likelihood of risk that a client such as myself is subjected to and had a duty to intervene as they now do to query in particular out-of pattern transactions of this kind.
It is perfectly obvious that Cash App, inadvertently, employs a subtle approach in addressing some of the key questions in a manner which neither provides me with adequate support nor protects anything other than its own interests.
It is Cash App here, who has the burden of proof, to show that it has exercised the duty of care, that is to say, that Cash App adhered to a standard of reasonable care in relation to the matter at issue given its extensive experience compared to mine. It is Cash App that claims that the damages which I have suffered in connection to this matter have not been reasonably foreseeable, and that my proposed degree of care is not, and has not been, commensurate with Cash App’s capacity, experience, expertise, or scope of services in any way. To reemphasize, Cash App’s indisputable overriding purpose is by no means to purely execute transactions in a blind and blank fashion, but rather to strike a balance between executing those transactions and capitalising on its undeniably vast capabilities to protect consumers thereby enhancing market integrity.
Apropos of the fluidity of the concept of reasonableness, all Cash App has done in this regard is set up a dichotomy of having or not having the legal obligation under consideration, however, that does not go one-inch toward explaining why various regulatory authorities, has maintained that financial institutions can, and should, protect consumers using their systems, advanced technologies, and rich experience.
Cash App is obliged to take some action if it is sufficiently aware of a real possibility that a fraud may be being perpetuated. If you don't question its customer’s instructions or raise the possibility of a scam with the customer in these circumstances, it may be liable if the red flags indicate the customer is:
• particularly vulnerable, or
• if the possibility of fraud was “serious or real”, not just suspected.
There are some recommendations to organisations for protecting customers from financial harm that might occur as a result of fraud or financial abuse; and gives guidance on how to recognise customers who might be at risk, how to assess the potential risks to the individual and how to take the necessary actions to prevent or minimise financial harm.
These recommendations are established as a general principle, the organisation should deliver a service that:
1) Takes a proactive approach to minimising risks, impact and incidences of financial harm and it sets out systems and tools for the prevention and detection of fraud and financial abuse. As a general point, it says organisations should ensure that all systems are developed using technologies and methodologies that are effective in the prevention of fraud and financial abuse, through authorised and unauthorised payments, thereby minimising the risk of financial harm to customers. As regards to the detection of fraud and financial abuse, it says the organisation:
A) should have measures in place across all payment channels and products to detect suspicious transactions or activities that might indicate fraud or financial abuse. It then lists the following examples of suspicious activity on customer accounts:
a. multiple cheque books;
b. sudden increased spending;
c. transfers to other accounts;
d. multiple password attempts;
e. logins from new devices, multiple geographical locations;
f. sudden changes to the operation of the account; “Unusual transactions are transactions whose amount, characteristics and frequency bear no relation to the economic activity of the customer, exceed normal market parameters or have no apparent legal justification.”
g. a withdrawal or payment for a large amount;
h. a payment or series of payments to a new payee;
i. financial activity that matches a known method of fraud or financial abuse.
B) organisations should have a process in place to ensure that staff make contact with the customer to verify the financial activity, challenge its authenticity, explain the nature of the suspected or detected fraud and discuss an appropriate plan of action.
Cash App are yet to show, or otherwise provide me with, a compelling argument that their wide ranging experience and wealth of specialist knowledge in detecting transactional anomalies were not sufficient to avert the fraud at issue. By contrast, I have provided a multitude of sound and powerful reasons by which requiring their involvement has not only been pressingly relevant but also eminently reasonable and well-justified.
Rather than empathising with and undertaking substantial efforts to convey their knowledge of the existence of such regulations abroad and thereafter use it to protect and proactively relieve the plight of consumers who have been cheated out of their money and whose role in society is properly fulfilled, positively contributing to local economic growth, development and sustainability – Cash App adopts a rather insouciant attitude toward my financial predicament portrayed herein.
I am deeply convinced that the disastrous results that I have previously elaborated upon will continue to ensue if no responsibility is adopted by Cash App in relation to this matter. I have also thoroughly detailed why they cannot simply dismiss this problem by strictly adhering to legal technicalities which, after careful reflection, struck me as being nothing more than self interest. Indeed, it seems to me utterly unfair to disregard fragile, sensitive, and vulnerable consumers who are afflicted by such allegedly malevolent acts, thereby keeping an unjust status-quo that is corrupting our society at its core.
Conclusion:
Based on my analysis, and as confirmed by various authorities concerned with such matters, there is abundant evidence that forward-thinking financial institutions ought to take reasonable steps to forestall fraud, or at least mitigate its risk by using an effective risk management system, demonstrating their undisputed ability to responsibly and pre-emptively respond to questionable transactions in the digital arena. The use of such systems, largely based on newly adopted technologies aimed at effectively navigating the evolving threat landscape, is only one of a number of possible endeavours undertaken in this connection, alongside the application of past knowledge and experience related to popular fraudulent practices.
Astonishingly, I am pondering how it is that, despite being shown that Cash App’s business conduct was insufficient insofar as background checks are concerned, they keep refuting their indisputable role and responsibility in connection with the matter herein discussed. The points that I have hitherto made are too crucial to be taken lightly. Cash App’s non-observance of the fundamental principles of justice – that is, to completely overlook and not even remotely try to mitigate the suffering of vulnerable consumers– is inexcusable given the size of the establishment and the vast resources at its disposal as the direct result of the patronage of clients like myself.
If it was, indeed, solely my responsibility, we must then believe at least one of the following clauses: a) financial institutions have absolutely no role whatsoever in preventing and detecting fraud, b) the fraud in question was not reasonably foreseeable, or c) the transactions in question were not sufficiently alarming. It is extremely unfortunate that Cash App pushes quite hard for me to believe all three of these things—despite evidence to the contrary.
In summary, I respectively ask your organisation to consider my points, given your personal and companywide obligation to provide a fair and reasonable investigation into the complaint.
I look forward to your input and would gladly cooperate to reach a fair and reasonable outcome. Thank you.
Mr. Gavin Bridwell
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27 September 2023
Mr. Gavin Bridwell
1815 McCord St,
Longview, TX 75605,
United States
September 27th 2023
CashApp
1455 Market St
San Francisco, CA 94103,
United States
Re: Demand Letter — Fraud
For negotiation purposes only, without effect as to any and all rights
Dear Sir or Madam,
I hope this letter has correctly found itself within your complaints/fraud department as it is essential to me that you become aware of the ordeal I have had to go through.
Commencing on or about June 2023, I fell victim to a multilayered scam operation orchestrated by “Mining Network Ltd” / “miningnetworkltd.com” (the “Company”), with the design, development, manufacture, promoting, marketing, distribution, labeling, and/or sale of illegal and outright fraudulent “investment services," all of which aim at contributing to the goal of robbing and defrauding clients, through a predetermined cycle of client losses to gains.
Money was transferred from my “Texas Bank and Trust” account to my “CashApp” account in the total amount of 30,000.00 USD utilizing your services.
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27 September 2023
OVERVIEW
• This letter shall thrust into the spotlight, inter alia, the increasingly important role those financial institutions play in the fight against financial crime and fraud, and the pressing need for enhanced supervision and vigilance within your organization.
• Here’s an indisputable fact: had you looked at the wider circumstances surrounding the above referenced transactions, this illicit transfer of wealth could have been prevented. • Obviously, there is no consensus with respect to the degree and scope to which regulated and licensed financial institutions must intervene and block suspicious transactions, and indeed, in so doing, financial institutions may often cause payments to be slowed down unnecessarily or even some legitimate payments may be rejected, however, please be noted that additional frictions such as slower payments (such as delaying payments or freezing funds to investigate) is beneficial to and welcomed by vulnerable customers and is widely considered to be a positive practice that is necessary in order to maintain their financial safety, particularly for large-value and/or out of pattern.
• Executing transactions without proper authority is not only a severe regulatory offense but also an irresponsible and reckless disregard of the customer’s financial safety.
• Against this background, and without derogating any of my rights, I hereby hold you liable for financial and emotional harm as well as medical problems relating to this victimization and insist that you reimburse my account in full within 14 days from the date of this letter.
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27 September 2023
INTRODUCTION
Financial crimes and fraud investigations often involve a high degree of sophistication, complexity, and sensitiveness to detail. Accordingly, this letter aims to address the issue at hand as profoundly and fairly as possible, by taking into consideration contextual regulations, laws, and bylaws, as well as guidance, standards and rules promoted by supervisory authorities, relevant codes of practice and (where suitable) what was good industry practice (GIP) at all times relevant hereto. The allegations contained herein are predicated either upon knowledge with respect to myself and my own experience, or upon facts obtained through investigations conducted by qualified third parties. I strongly believe that substantive evidence in support of the allegations set forth herein will be found after an appropriate opportunity for discovery. Key facts supporting the allegations contained herein are known only to the Company and/or are exclusively within their control.
The Company cleverly orchestrated a prevalent scheme of deception to lead people to invest significant sums while knowing that those would-be investors would ultimately lose the money, they had entrusted to it. The overall purpose of the scheme, in other words, was to target and defraud people who are often inexperienced and naive, in pursuance of illicit wealth through various fraudulent representations.
I did not know, and through the exercise of reasonable diligence could not have discovered, the fraud that was being perpetrated upon me by the Company. Fraud is commonly conceptualized as withholding from the weaker party in a financial transaction (e.g., an investor) information which is necessary to make an informed, rational or autonomous decision.
In this regard, even access to adequate information is insufficient to achieve complete autonomy. A complication here is that the weaker party, amateur/unseasoned investors in particular, might have trouble analyzing the data at hand sufficiently well to identify fraudulent schemes. Unfortunately, because financial products are often abstract and complex, there is no easy solution to this problem.
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27 September 2023
Therefore, full autonomy of investors might not only require access to sufficient information, but also access to relevant technologies, know-how, processing capabilities, and resources to analyze the information.
A reasonable solution is that financial institutions would be required to promote transparent communication in which they track the understanding of its customers.
According to the Federal Trade Commission’s interpretations of certain terms (like the words deceptive and unfair), the FTC has found that a “deceptive act or practice” encompasses “a representation, omission or practice that is likely to mislead the consumer acting reasonably in the circumstances, to the consumer’s detriment.”
The federal courts have defined a “deceptive trade practice” [i]as any act or practice that has the tendency or capacity to deceive consumers and have defined an “unfair trade practice” as any act or practice that offends public policy and is immoral, unethical, oppressive, unscrupulous, or substantially injurious to consumers.
The false representations and omissions made by the Company have a tendency or capacity to deceive consumers, such as myself, into unwittingly providing funds that fueled the Company’s fraudulent scheme and are therefore, by their very nature, jointly— immoral, unethical, oppressive, unscrupulous, and substantially injurious to consumers.
As a result of the Company’s deceptive trade practices, I was deceived into transferring my funds for investment returns that were never delivered. I will certainly never receive any monetary value for the investments considering the way the Company had their scheme rigged, thus causing significant economic damage to me. The false statements of material facts and omissions as described above; and the fraudulent transactions the Company perpetrated upon me; were unfair, unconscionable, and deceptive practices which would have likely deceived any reasonable person under the circumstances.
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27 September 2023
MERCHANT’S FRAUD SCHEME — ALLEGATIONS
The Company hired, managed, and trained personnel, and collaborated with others as accomplices to their crimes to induce fraud that resulted in my financial and psychological damages. These include, but are not limited to, the following allegations, all of which involve criminal, non-regulated, and malicious activities:
1. The Company directed and instructed others to work from shell companies that were operating from various unassociated locations across the globe.
2. The Company opened bank accounts and established Crypto Wallets in multiple countries and different crypto exchange platforms (including yours) and used them through their accomplices and strawmen from around the world to conceal and disguise the identity of illegally obtained proceeds so that they appear to have originated from legitimate sources.
3. The Company intentionally committed fraudulent misrepresentation, and falsified its agent names, credentials, competencies, qualifications and location. The Company’s name is merely a brand name, officially owned by shell corporations located offshore. In reality, the entire operation is being conducted from elsewhere (supposed location is evidently fictitious), and on top of that the call center, marketing, and decision making, are all being performed by completely anonymous and hidden entities. Concealing true identities and utilizing front companies as a vehicle for a wide spectrum of financial maneuvers is a notorious practice of criminal organizations.
4. The Company has blatantly violated international laws, as it has been practicing without a license and funneling enormous sums of money, through countries and jurisdictions that require registration to operate.
5. The Company provided direct investment advice - not utilizing 3rd party recommendations (e.g., “according to Bloomberg TV/Investing.com”)
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27 September 2023
6. The Company offered investment services/advice not related to real market/exchange data (manufacturing false charts etc.). The trading platform was purposely manipulated in a way that each client would ineluctably and unknowingly lose money, as the trades were simply concocted. Instead, the Company’s staff and its accomplices simply pocketed the money.
7. The Company prohibited my ability to withdraw my funds.
8. The Company was guaranteeing returns/yields (unrealistic ones).
9. The Company furnished me with bonuses - which are not allowed to be given.
10. My money was not held in a segregated account.
11. The Company did not advertise/disclose/was not transparent regarding the statistical data representing the percentage of total client losses at the company.
12. The Company did not mention the commission and overnight swaps.
13. The Company did not read the risk disclosure prior to my deposit(s).
14. The Company used high pressure tactics and outbursts, which took a severe toll on my health. 15. Armed with my personal details, the Company’s staff seduced me into transferring all of my savings to them. They utilized their knowledge of my cultural context, which stressed square and honorable business dealings along with honesty, in order to maliciously take advantage of my trusting nature.
Please take notice that my funds were transferred through means of coercion and under false pretenses. Attached, please find supportive statements, screenshots, and further evidence.
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27 September 2023
EXPOSING YOUR ORGANIZATION’S MISCONDUCT
I hereby allege that your organization has completely failed to adequately investigate the circumstances surrounding the transactions in question and willfully blinded itself to obvious red flags.
Many suspicions should have arisen at your organization as an issue of great concern, with respect to the unusual activity taking place in my account. Despite the regulatory and statutory requirements your organization should abide by as a licensed and regulated financial institution — and instead of detecting patterns, drawing certain conclusions, and taking actions accordingly— you at best, merely and insufficiently performed some hasty and haphazard reviews of the transactions or possibly asked only minimal generic questions regarding the suspicious activities, and at worst, shut your eyes completely rather than being careful, methodical, and vigilant. Had you bothered, you would probably have realized that the funds were associated with fraud and financial crime, rather than some other legitimate revenue/activity.
In light of the above, and after conducting a comprehensive review of our communication/interactions, it has become glaringly obvious to me that no adequate information and/or documentation were sought by your organization, at best, and at worst —no appropriate safeguards were implemented.
If a financial institution executes a customer order to transfer money knowing it to be “dishonestly given, shutting its eyes to the obvious fact of the dishonesty, or acting recklessly in failing to make such inquiries as an honest and reasonable individual would undergo”, it would be in breach of its duty of care, even if the payment was made in accordance with the terms of the mandate, and the financial institution should still be liable for negligence resulting in damages.
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27 September 2023
Compliance departments should ensure that staff members understand the legal requirements and where there are suspicions, these suspicions be communicated to all relevant personnel whilst being investigated.
For the avoidance of doubt, reasonable grounds should not necessarily be interpreted as proof. On the basis of various signs, you should have assumed that something suspicious was going on therefore should have suspended transactions until reasonable enquiries could be made to verify that the transactions were properly executed. In other words, I am a victim of your negligence for facilitating the misappropriation of funds, and doing little to safeguard public financial interests. Any reasonable staff member would have realized that there were many obvious, even glaring, signs that I was being defrauded. (Singul[censored]dings Limited (in liquidation) v Daiwa Capital Markets Europe Limited [2019] UKSC 50)[ii]
You knew or should have known that the funds being transferred through your services did not rightfully belong to the recipient fraudsters. Similarly, you knew or should have known that the funds being transferred through your services serve no legitimate or lawful purpose. You turned a blind eye to the crimes that you have facilitated and thus provided an array of essential money transfer services, acting as a vehicle, with the awareness that it was enabling the fraudsters to commit crimes and enrich themselves with the funds of their victims.
Your services undoubtedly served as a crucial element in the fraudulent scheme detailed herein, and you were either unaware of your complicity in the fraud, or, more worryingly, completely aware and silent. Had you conducted an adequate account analysis, you would have discovered the nature of the recipient, and subsequently, disclosed and reported the fraudsters’ activities to law enforcement
authorities/agencies and regulators. Instead, to satisfy your financial interests, you conveniently closed your eyes, even though you undeniably had, at all material times, the necessary controls and resources to influence, whether directly or indirectly, those particular transactions.
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27 September 2023
You also had the duty to stop those crimes, yet you refused to do so because you were more interested in enriching yourself, even if it meant furthering those crimes and allowing them to cause massive financial losses to plenty of victims — many of whom are probably your customers. Therefore, it is clear that you did not have in place adequate security measures to properly safeguard my assets — hence, you have irreparably harmed me and, if not enjoined, will continue to irreparably harm other victims as well as their loved ones and associates. You have irreparably harmed me and, if not enjoined, will continue to irreparably harm the general public, and our society
deserves better.
“A financial institution which wrongly pays money away when it has no authority to do so will usually be treated as if it had paid using its own funds, not those of its customer.”
When discussing the responsibilities that a financial institution might incur, it is crucial not to forget the fact that a legitimate complaint by, or cause of action on the part of, a client might generate/give rise to further statutory cause of action and/or additional liabilities beholden by a financial institution to the relevant regulatory authority. Obligations/duties beholden by a financial institution to a regulator are distinct from those beholden to the customer. Moreover, you may be held liable to more than one regulator.
As a regulated and licensed financial institution, you have strict statutory and regulatory obligations to monitor transactions and report any suspicious activities to law enforcement authorities. The importance of implementing robust internal systems to detect and report money laundering and other suspicious activities has been continuously emphasized in the industry in addition to having the appropriate policies, procedures and internal controls in place to ensure ongoing compliance in respect to the aforementioned systems. You should have analysed and distinguished thereafter between that which may be normal activity and that which could suggest an illegal activity. This is a well-known standard industry practice which plays a substantial role in preventing criminals from liquidating and laundering funds.
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27 September 2023
FRAUD
Actual fraud can be described, inter alia, as “suppression of that which is true, by one having knowledge or belief of the fact.” Therefore, due to your actual knowledge that such scams are so prevalent, you are liable for damages. Similarly, due to the fact that you knew or were grossly negligent in not knowing that such scams should not be entrusted with your customer funds—you are likewise liable for committing actual fraud and thus, are responsible for any damages caused to me as a result.
NEGLIGENT MISREPRESENTATION
Your organization, by acts of both omission and commission, whether directly or indirectly, are responsible for false/inaccurate/misleading statements of material facts concerning the services that I received. Specifically, your representations to myself, inter alia:
(a) you had in place adequate security measures to properly safeguard customer’s assets; (b) your organization’s technology was, for all intents and purposes, free of any inherent flaws that might expose your customers to transactional irregularities;
(c) your organization was able to take full responsibility if things go wrong; and (d) your organization’s technology was, for all intents and purposes, free of any inherent flaws that might expose your customers to fraud.
Additionally, it is hereby alleged that your manoeuvres, whether premeditated or not – despite the fact that you expressly establish to promote fairness and customer confidence – are actually used to blind your customers, thereby depriving them of disclosures regarding the involved risk factors, potential threats, and other information required by law.
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27 September 2023
UNJUST ENRICHMENT
By engaging in the conduct described herein, you, directly or indirectly, knowingly and/or with severe recklessness, in particular by not doing enough to fight against financial crime, have reaped the benefits from allowing the transfer of funds to the Company, thereby causing actual harm to a substantial amount of people. Retaining the said monetary benefits, as a result of your misconduct alleged herein, is unconscionable and against the fundamental principles of justice.
VIOLATIONS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
By reason of this misconduct, you violated, and if not enjoined will continue to violate, many of the international anti-fraud policies, which are established to facilitate the development of controls that aid in the detection and prevention of fraud worldwide.
Your organization’s blatant disregard of its obligation to maintain my financial safety has caused significant, irreparable damage and injury to me. Much of which is clearly a result of negligence or so easily subject to investigation that it is apparent that you misappropriated the funds either knowingly or with reckless disregard to whether these transactions were lawful or not. You have an independent and non-delegable duty to conduct a reasonable investigation of any and all transactions and the
failure to do so is a violation of the law and of the rights of those affected by such negligence. AIDING AND ABETTING
By engaging in the conduct described herein, you, knowingly or recklessly, promoted transactions, practices, and courses of business which operate or would operate as a fraud and deceit upon the purchasers and provided substantial assistance to the commission of financial crime. By engaging in
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the conduct described herein, which no doubt is a substantial factor in causing my injuries, you aided and abetted the Company and if not enjoined, will continue to aid and abet violations.
As a direct, foreseeable, and proximate result of your conduct, I have sustained and continue to sustain substantial injuries, which include, but are not limited to: financial loss, humiliation, embarrassment, severe mental and emotional distress, and discomfort, which encompass damages which total in excess of initial injuries caused by the monetary loss due to the monies that were transferred to the fraudsters.
LACK OF VIGILANCE
Rather than engage in any interactive process, you instead acted rashly and without prudence, and I was harmed as a result. Your failure to engage in good-faith interactive processes was, again, a substantial factor in causing harm to me. It has already been established that there are some situations where financial institutions should not take customer instruction at 'face value' and should have observed the wider circumstances surrounding transactions prior to authorising their execution.
During the course of our relations, you failed to prevent me, as your customer, from engaging in such actions that resulted in my being subject to financial abuse and failed to introduce an adequate risk based approach as set out by the applicable regulations and guidelines.
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27 September 2023
FURTHER POINTS FOR CONSIDERATION
It is well-established that a compensation obligation arises in the circumstances discussed above as contemplated by the standards, and that the regulated and licensed financial institutions, despite not having perpetrated the fraud themselves, should be uniquely placed in the role of an insurer, insofar as reasonable. Granted, the fraud has taken place entirely outside of the domain of the financial institution, nevertheless, both common sense and methodological approaches to problem-solving
suggest that the financial institution should have had the investigative powers, the know-how, and the resources not only to detect this foreseeable fraud but also to discover the nature or merits of this claim, and when appropriate, reimburse the client. In the computer age, when access to technology and information is abundant, it is no longer exclusively a matter for law enforcement or government
led action.
Moreover, it is better to seek to protect users, increase costs for users, and even limit choice, than to achieve a compromised protective environment and in doing so provide fertile ground for criminal organizations to flourish and enrich themselves.
FRAUD DETECTION SERVICES
It is clear that I was injured through the misconduct described above and was subject to the fraudsters' unfair and unlawful conduct. It is clear that under the circumstances, any rational individual would have been deceived just as easily as I have been, hence I suggest that you adapt yourself, as a respectable and resourceful financial institution, to the technologically rapid-changing financial service environment. If you are serious about fighting crime, it is upon you to invest in fraud detection services, irrespective of whether or not it is expressly specified in the relevant regulatory requirements.
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Fraud detection services are often predicated on non-PII data (Non-Personally Identifiable Information) thus not robbing individuals of their anonymity. Instead, they utilize digital footprints and behaviour analysis. Moreover, unless one is intentionally cheating, the implementation of fraud detection should not compromise his or her trust in the financial institution.
I would also like to refer to the abundance of independent technology companies which are starting to emerge and are scoring the risk of each transaction. This type of risk assessment service is “maturing more quickly in cryptocurrency payment applications, where exchanges like Coinbase and Binance or vendors like Chainalysis, Neutrino and DeepCyber are performing or offering fraud and money laundering scoring services either for themselves (i.e., in the case of exchanges) or for third parties, which for now are primarily banks (in the case of vendors). “
It is expected of firms to take action within the existing legislative and regulatory framework to suspend or freeze payments based on their risk assessment managing the risks of financial crime. The standards that financial institutions need to meet would include processes – such as the use of technology, rules and procedures – that help prevent and respond to scams similar to the one described herein.
FURTHER POINTS FOR CONSIDERATION
Your organization conspicuously touts security as a reason to use their service. Specifically, your website states: “Cash App monitors your account for anything that looks out of the ordinary. If a potentially fraudulent payment occurs, we cancel it to prevent you from being charged. When this happens, your funds will instantly be returned to your Cash App balance or linked bank account.” (https://cash.app/help/3054-payment-canceled-eta-refund) Furthermore, I was disheartened by the fact that these fraudulent transactions, which amount to a staggering 30,000.00 USD, could have been easily prevented, as they were completely out of character for me and diverged from my previous financial decisions.
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27 September 2023
CONCLUSION
If a full refund is not administered within 14 days from the date of this letter, in addition to a refund amount, a request for reimbursement of attorney’s fees, filing fees, and any further costs associated with obtaining the refund amount may be pursued.
If despite the credibility of this claim, you do not take steps to assist in shutting down this lifeline to the fraudster’s operation or to expose the illegal activities to law enforcement authorities, you are obviously directly participating in a fraud. No matter how inexplicable and suspicious these transactions were, you executed each and every transaction, thus unlawfully generating immense profits from a fraud. In order to perpetrate the fraud, the criminals needed a financial institution that would be friendly and hospitable to scammers, in other words, an institution which would blind itself to and overlook suspicious activity, completely ignore the grossly excessive activities in their clients’ accounts, and conveniently ignore its obligations under the law. It was not reasonable, during the time the transactions in question were executed, for you to believe that the transactions were a result of anything other than misappropriation of the funds, especially in light of the fact that you were fully aware, at the relevant time period, that such scams are prevalent and could have done more to spot it before the money was handed over.
In the event of non-compliance with the demand mentioned above, your organization, knowingly or unknowingly, manifestly jeopardize its business through its association with the criminals: those who are not direct accomplices to the commission of a crime but rather are permissive of the criminal behavior after the crime has been committed can also be charged with a crime. Being permissive, even if not present when the crime was committed, by not reporting the crime to the authorities and not trying to do your part in remedying the situation, makes you an accessory to the crime. In accordance with moral law, if you unknowingly assist criminal behavior and remain impartial after discovering such, you are seen as obstructing justice.
Page 16of 16
27 September 2023
This letter does not realize the full extent of my claims, rights, and remedies against you or any of your affiliates, parents and subsidiary corporations, including, without limitation, your representative managing partners, officers, directors, shareholders, employees, agents, attorneys, assigns, successors, servants, insurers, and representatives, in any matter whatsoever, including the present context of this letter, as that will not detract from my rights and claims in any form or manner whatsoever, or constitute any concessions on my behalf against you and against others.
Sincerely,
Mr. Gavin Bridwell
+ 19037462599 | [email protected]
i The Federal Trade Commission (FTC) Act, 15 U.S.C. §45 (1995)
ii Singularis Holdings Limited (in liquidation) v Daiwa Capital Markets Europe Limited [2019] UKSC 50
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Mr. Gavin Bridwell
1815 McCord St,
Longview, TX 75605,
United States
August 1, 2021
To: Cash App
1455 Market St
San Francisco, CA 94103,
United States
Subject: Mr. Gavin Bridwell’s complain to Cash App
FAO: Cash App’s complaints dept.
Dear Sir / Madam,
This is my subsequent letter pursuant to the original, unanswered disputed letter sent to Cash App on the September 27th,2023.
With this letter, I hereby express my utmost dissatisfaction with your lack of reply to the above referenced letter and reiterate key points that were raised and left unanswered previously supporting my request for your cooperation.
As I mentioned I fell victim to a multilayered scam operation orchestrated by “Mining Network Ltd” / “miningnetworkltd.com” (the “Company”) and innocently lost 30,000.00 USD of my hard-earned life-savings due to your misadministration.
This complex issue has caused substantial harm to me, and if not appropriately addressed, will cause substantial harm to others, we must therefore conduct an in-depth and comprehensive review of all of the contributing factors that have led to an outcome as horrendous as the one described herein.
Due to personal circumstances, I was particularly vulnerable during the victimization period; I was also relatively financially illiterate and very inexperienced in the finance sector which made me a prime target for criminal enterprises in this field.
Financial institutions are well aware of the scope and nature of such crimes and the risks that these poses to their clients, who, in contrast, mostly have limited knowledge of these dangers.
To be clear, people who have been scammed such as myself, are not individuals who have made poor investment decisions. They are people who have been tricked, lied to, deceived and emotionally manipulated. Sophisticated, aggressive sales techniques end up trapping the uninformed and unsuspecting victim who once in the clutches of the scammer cannot get out until most or all of the funds have been lost (stolen) by the scammers. A good comparison is a perpetrator who “grooms” his victim whilst at the same time assaults him/her and prevents them from escaping.
Based on my analysis, and as confirmed by various authorities concerned with such matters, there is abundant evidence that forward-thinking financial institutions ought to take reasonable steps to forestall fraud, or at least mitigate its risk by using an effective risk management system, demonstrating their undisputed ability to responsibly and preemptively respond to questionable transactions in the digital arena. The use of such systems, largely based on newly adopted technologies aimed at effectively navigating the evolving threat landscape, is only one of a number of possible endeavors undertaken in this connection, alongside the application of past knowledge and experience related to popular fraudulent practices.
What can Cash App do?
Please be noted that I will not in any way quietly tolerate the consequences of your actions (or more precisely, the lack thereof). It is perfectly obvious that you could have, and should have, utilized various risk-based examination procedures and techniques, all of which are within your purview and could have entirely prevented this disastrous outcome.
As previously advised, you should have known, suspected, or had reason to suspect that the transactions (or pattern of transactions):
? involve funds the ultimate purpose of which was to fuel an illegal enterprise; ? is intended to disguise funds the ultimate purpose of which was to fuel an illegal enterprise, in an attempt to avoid and thus violate regulations;
? is intentionally designed to defraud your customer;
? serves no legitimate or lawful purpose; and
? involve the use of your services to facilitate criminal activity.
There are so many other ways in which measures related to fraud prevention and mitigation could have been useful. Further factors that should have been taken into consideration include, but are not limited to, the following:
? The timing, volume, frequency, and nature of the transactions in question; ? The abnormality of such transactions against the background of your experience with me as a customer and other entities associated with the transactions (if any); ? The suspicious nature of such transactions based on my overall risk profile including vulnerability and identification and research of high-risk services/products; ? Systemic filtering mechanisms, whether manual or automatic, for the identification of unusual activities; and
? Periodic evaluation of the usefulness, appropriateness and effectiveness of anti-fraud programs, and other associated policies and procedures.
Relevant industry practices at the time of the victimization:
Cash App is obliged to take some action if it is sufficiently aware of a real possibility that a fraud may be being perpetuated. If you don't question its customer’s instructions or raise the possibility of a scam with the customer in these circumstances, it may be liable if the red flags indicate the customer is:
• particularly vulnerable, or
• if the possibility of fraud was “serious or real”, not just suspected.
There are some recommendations to organizations for protecting customers from financial harm that might occur as a result of fraud or financial abuse; and gives guidance on how to recognize customers who might be at risk, how to assess the potential risks to the individual and how to take the necessary actions to prevent or minimize financial harm.
These recommendations are established as a general principle, the organization should deliver a service that:
1) Takes a proactive approach to minimizing risks, impact and incidences of financial harm and it sets out systems and tools for the prevention and detection of fraud and financial abuse. As a general point, it says organizations should ensure that all systems are developed using technologies and methodologies that are effective in the prevention of fraud and financial abuse, through authorized and unauthorized payments, thereby minimizing the risk of financial harm to customers. As regards to the detection of fraud and financial abuse, it says the organization:
A) should have measures in place across all payment channels and products to detect suspicious transactions or activities that might indicate fraud or financial abuse. It then lists the following examples of suspicious activity on customer accounts:
a. multiple cheque books;
b. sudden increased spending;
c. transfers to other accounts;
d. multiple password attempts;
e. logins from new devices, multiple geographical locations;
f. sudden changes to the operation of the account; “Unusual transactions are transactions whose amount, characteristics and frequency bear no relation to the economic activity of the customer, exceed normal market parameters or have no apparent legal justification.”
g. a withdrawal or payment for a large amount;
h. a payment or series of payments to a new payee;
i. financial activity that matches a known method of fraud or financial abuse.
B) organizations should have a process in place to ensure that staff make contact with the customer to verify the financial activity, challenge its authenticity, explain the nature of the suspected or detected fraud and discuss an appropriate plan of action.
Conclusion:
It is increasingly imperative that deposit-takers run thorough background checks to detect high risk transactions and continuously ensure that no payment is aiding money laundering activities and/or fraud.
If you're operating at a level that's beyond your competence all you're going to do is make catastrophic mistakes. It is much more noble and probably enormously useful to concentrate on restoring dignity to victims, than hide things in the fog and thereby having a destabilizing influence on market integrity and financial stability of consumers.
By adequately assessing systemic risks and appropriately responding to them, market integrity is enhanced, the financial infrastructure is strengthened, and fraud is significantly minimized.
The upshot of this is that my complaint shouldn’t be disregarded or unfairly lumped in with ones that were lodged in a manifestly frivolous or vexatious fashion. When roles and responsibilities come into conflict, it’s crucial to lay out the explicit assumptions by
having a local discussion; when we’re forced to defend our presumptions, we should be able to know how to do it by having a cogent argument at hand.
I do urge you to look rather more carefully at the proposition.
Gavin Bridwell